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Gigantic Shipbuilders under the IMO Mandate of GHG Emissions:
With Special References to China, Japan and Korea

Yubing Shi∗

To address greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping, the International Maritime
Organization has adopted technical and operational measures, and discussed the possibility of
adopting market-based measures. China, Japan and South Korea are major shipbuilding nations
in the world, and have differing responses towards the IMO’s regulatory initiatives. This paper
conducts a comparative assessment of these three countries’ positions on regulatory principles of
the greenhouse gas issue, and concludes that their differentiated perspectives on this matter reflect
their different regulatory interests. It is significant to take their differentiated interests into
account in the developing regulatory regime to avoid disproportionate burdens being placed on
certain countries, in particular developing countries.

Keywords
Greenhouse Gas, International Shipping, CBDR Principle, China, Japan, South
Korea

I. Introduction
Climate change is one of the most significant challenges to the mankind of the 21st century.
This new phenomenon requires “substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas
emissions” (“GHGs”).1 Climate change is also related to international shipping, the backbone
of global trade and a driving force of the economic globalisation.2 Although often recognised
∗
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Wollongong. M.TCP (Wollongong), LL.M. (Beijing Technology & Business Univ.), B.A. (Beijing Forestry
Univ.). The author is grateful to Associate Professor Robin Warner and Professor Warwick Gullett for their
comments on some of the issues covered in this paper. The views expressed in this paper remain the sole
responsibility of its author. This research was supported by Global Challenges Ph.D. Scholars program of
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Innovation Campus, University of Wollongong, NSW 2500 Australia.
1

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'Fifth Assessment Report: Working Group I Report'
(2013),
Summary
for
Policymakers,
19,
available
at
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf (last visited on Oct. 10, 2014).
2

International shipping generally refers to “shipping between ports of different countries” and excludes military
and fishing vessels engaged on such voyages. See Øyvind. Buhaug et al., Second IMO GHG Study 2009, 13
(2009). International shipping carries around 80% of global trade by volume. United Nations Conference on
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as a relatively environmental sound method of transportation,3 international shipping has
been reported to have significant and growing influence on climate change. 4 Given the
urgency of emissions reduction and the global nature of the shipping industry, the
international community has responded to this imperative and begun to develop a regulatory
framework.
The international regulatory efforts in regulating GHG emissions from international
shipping can be traced back to the year 1995 when the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) 5 ’s Subsidiary Body on Scientific and
Technological Advice (“SBSTA”) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (“SBI”) were
requested to examine the allocation and control of emissions from international bunker
fuels. 6 In 1996, SBSTA identified five options from the eight options provided by the
UNFCCC Secretariat as the basis for future work on the allocation of emissions from
aviation and marine bunker fuels.7 In order to include GHG emissions from international
shipping into a State-based convention, the emissions have to be allocated to different
countries. However, this approach failed in reaching consensus among States. 8 As a
consequence, Article 2(2) of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC authorised the
International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) to regulate the GHG emissions from
international shipping. 9 Since then, two parallel regimes have been contributing to the

Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), Review of Maritime Transport (2013), xi, available at
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2013_en.pdf (last visited on Sept. 28, 2014).
3

See, e.g., C. Pisani, Fair at Sea: The Design of A Future Legal Instrument on Marine Bunker Fuels Emissions
within the Climate Change Regime, 33 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 57-76, 57 (2002).
4

In 2007, CO emissions from international shipping reached 870 million tonnes, which covers 2.7% of the
global emissions of CO . If left unchecked, CO emissions from international shipping may grow by 150-250%
by 2050 compared with 2007 due to projected growth in demand for maritime transport service. Buhaug et al,
supra note 2, at 1.
5

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, reported in 31
I.L.M. 848.
6

Methodological Issues, Decision 4/CP.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, art 1(f), at
16, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (Apr. 7, 1995).
7

These five options are: (1) no allocation; (2) allocation to the country where the bunker fuel is sold; (3)
allocation to the country of the transporting company, the country of registration of registration of the
aircraft/vessel, or the country of the operator; (4) allocation to the country of departure or destination of the
aircraft/vessel; and (5) allocation to the country of departure or destination of the passenger/cargo. See S.
Oberthür, Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Transport: ICAO,
IMO and the Kyoto Protocol, 3 Climate Pol’y 191-205, 193 (2003).
8

Id.

9

Article 2(2) of the Kyoto protocol provides that: “The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine
bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime
Organization, respectively.” Kyoto Protocol, art 2(2), Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, reported in 37 I.L.M.
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international regulatory process of this GHG issue.
The first regime is based on the global climate change where SBSTA worked on marine
bunker fuels in 1996, which afterwards has been collaborated with the IMO. The Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (“AWG-LCA”) under UNFCCC had
been working on the issue of international bunker fuels before 2012.10 Without substantial
outcomes on GHG emissions issue, the AWG-LCA finalized its work in 2012 Doha Climate
Change Conference as mandated. Currently the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action (“ADP”) is working on negotiating a global climate change
agreement that will be adopted by 2015 and will enter into force from 2020. Nevertheless,
whether or to what extent that the 2015 climate change agreement will involve GHG
emissions from international shipping remains unclear.
The second regime is related to the IMO GHG emissions where the IMO has adopted
relevant conventions, codes, resolutions and guidelines to regulate GHG emissions issue. Of
these various regulative initiatives, Resolution 811 and Resolution A.963 (23)12 were adopted
by the IMO in 1997 and 2003, respectively, which have underpinned the subsequent actions
of the IMO. To date, three categories of measures have been discussed within the
Organization in order to address GHG emissions from ships, namely technical measures,
operational measures, and market-based measures (“MBMs”).13 After lengthy deadlock of
negotiations on shipping GHG emissions within the IMO, shipping GHG emissions were
partially regulated by technical and operational measures on July 15, 2011. This regulation
takes the form of amended Annex VI to the International Convention for the Prevention of

22. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol only listed six types of GHGs, namely CO , CH , N O, HFCs, PFCs and SF , but
a seventh type of GHG, NF was added to the category in the Durban Climate Change Conference in 2011. The
GHG emissions from international shipping mainly constitute CO , CH , N O and HFC. See Outcome of the
Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at
its Sixteenth Session, Decision 1/CMP.7, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Seventh Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012), available
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf (last visited on Oct. 10, 2014).
10

AWG-LCA discussed the issue of international bunker fuels under paragraph 1b(iv) of the Bali Action Plan.
Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session,
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008).
11

Resolution 8 on ‘CO emissions from ships’ requests the IMO to undertake a study on GHG emissions from
ships and consider feasible CO reduction strategies. IMO, Main Events in IMO's Work on Limitation and
Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping (2011), ¶para 12, available at
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/resources/Pages/Greenhouse%20gas%20emissions.aspx (last visited on Sept.
28, 2014).
12

IMO Policies and Practices Related to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, IMO
Assembly 23rd Session, Agenda Item 19, IMO Doc Res A.963(23) (Dec. 5, 2003) (IMO Resolution A.963(23)).
13

IMO, supra note 11, at ¶50.
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Pollution from Ships (hereinafter MARPOL 73/78).14 By adding a new Chapter 4 to Annex VI
on the regulation on energy efficiency for ships, this amendment makes mandatory the
Energy Efficiency Design Index (“EEDI”) for new ships,15 and the Ship Energy Efficiency
Management Plan (“SEEMP”) for all ships.16 As this regulation was adopted by a majority
vote rather than consensus, it is predicted that the future enforcement of this regulation will
face certain challenges and uncertainties.17 To date seven types of MBM proposals, 18 which
aim to complement the technical and operational measures in reducing shipping GHG
emissions,19 have been submitted to the IMO for discussions.
China, Japan, and South Korea are main flag States and shipping nations of the world. In
particular, the shares of the global shipbuilding order book (in Gross Tonnage) by these
three countries accounted for 88.49% in 2012. 20 Therefore, the responses of these three

14

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), Nov. 2, 1973, 1340
U.N.T.S. 61, reported in 12 I.L.M. 1319, as amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention, 1341 UNTS
3, 17, reported in I.L.M. 546. To date, MARPOL 73/78 has adopted 6 annexes and their revisions, and Annex VI
(Air Pollution from Ships) entered into force on May 19, 2005. See Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI and the
NO Technical Code 2008, IMO Doc Res MEPC.251(66) (Apr. 4, 2014).
15

As the main technical measure, the EEDI provides a specific figure representing a minimum energy efficiency
level or technological threshold for certain ship types and size segments. Ship designers and shipbuilders are
free to choose the most cost-efficient technological solutions for the ship once the minimum energy efficiency
level required by the EEDI is achieved. IMO, supra note 11, at ¶57.

16

The SEEMP is an operational measure. As a ship-specific energy management plan, the SEEMP provides a
flexible mechanism for shipowners and ship operators to monitor ship and fleet efficiency performance over
time in a cost-effective manner. The Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI) is often utilized as a
monitoring tool and to establish benchmarks related to ships’ energy efficiency. Id. at 59.
17

See, e.g., James Harrison, Recent Developments and Continuing Challenges in the Regulation of Greenhouse
Gas Emissions from International Shipping (2012), 2, University of Edinburgh Research Paper Series, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037038 (last visited Oct. 2, 2013); Md. Saiful Karim, IMO Mndatory Eergy
Efficiency Measures for International Shipping: The First Mantory Global Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Instrument for an International Industry, 7 MACQ. J. INT’L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 113 (2011).
18

These seven types of MBM proposals are International GHG Fund, port State levy, Efficiency Incentive
Scheme (EIS), Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT), Global Emissions Trading System (ETS) for
international shipping, Penalty on Trade and Development, and Rebate Mechanism (RM). Among them, the
SECT and Penalty on Trade and Development have been modified to be strengthened technical and operational
measures. However, as options for possible MBMs, these two MBM proposals are still on the table. See Further
Details on the US Proposal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, submitted by the
United States, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/INF.24 (Jul 23, 2010); How Technical
and Operational Measures are the Only Direct and Effective Means to Deliver Cuts in C  Emissions,
submitted by the Bahamas, Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd
Session, Agenda Item 2, IMO Doc GHG-WG 3/2 (Dec. 22, 2010).
19

Recent research indicates that to achieve absolute emissions reduction using the EEDI and SEEMP alone is
not possible due to the projected growth in international seaborne trade. See Z. Bazari & T. Longva, Assessment
of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping8, IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.2,
annex( Oct. 31, 2011).
20

Council Working Party on Shipbuilding, Peer Review of Japanese Government Support Measures to the
Shipbuilding Sector (2013), 29, available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/C-WP6%282012%2926-FINALENG.pdf (last visited on Oct. 2, 2014).
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countries to the IMO’s regulatory initiatives, in particular the applicable regulatory
principles, to a significant extent determine whether these measures could be effectively
enforced by global shipping industries, and are thus worthy of an assessment. Different from
China and Japan who are widely accepted as a developing and a developed country
respectively, the status of South Korea is a bit ambiguous; she has been regarded as a
developed country by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) and other international organisations.21 However, South Korea is also a UNFCCC
non-Annex I State; it means she has been identified as a developing country under the global
climate change regime. For these reasons the views of Korean Government, as well as its
shipping industry, on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships are different from those of
Japan. In this sense, China, Japan, and South Korea represent a major developing country, a
typical developed country, and a developed but treated as a developing country respectively.
A comparative assessment of these three countries’ perspectives on GHG emissions from
ships can reflect the positions of many other developing countries and developed countries.
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine and compare the perspectives of China,
Japan, and South Korea on regulatory principles of GHG emissions from international
shipping. These countries’ positions on the IMO’s mandate and competence to regulate GHG
emissions from ships are also analyzed for their relevance with applicable principles of this
GHG issue. This article is divided into four parts including Introduction and Conclusion.
Part two will investigate the shipping industries of China, Japan and Korea. Part three will
compare the perspectives of those three countries on regulatory principles of GHG
Emissions from international shipping.
II. The Shipping Industries in China, Japan and South Korea
A. China
Although China’s first international shipping company was established in 1961, the benign
development of China’s international shipping sector, as well as its shipbuilding sector, only
started in 1978 when its reform and opening up policy was adopted.22 China’s shipping
21

See, e.g., Australian Government: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, List of Developing Countries as Declared by
the Minister for Foreign Affairs (2013), available at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/ngos/Documents/list-developingcountries.pdf (last visited on Sept. 28, 2014); American Mathematical Society, Developing Countries List,
available at http://www.ams.org/membership/individual/types/mem-develop (last visited on Sept. 28, 2014);
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (2011), 172, available at
http://www.ioha2012.net/?page_id=1945 (last visited on Sept. 28, 2014).
22

Gao Weijie, Development Strategy of Chinese Shipping Company under the Multilateral Framework of WTO
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industry has achieved rapid development after three decades’ development. As of January 1,
2013, China ranked ninth in the world among the flags of registration with the largest
registered deadweight tonnage.23 In the same year, China owned the third largest fleet in the
world with 190,078,835 deadweight tonnages, which covered 11.78% of the world fleet.24
However, 64.79% of these Chinese owned fleets (in terms of deadweight tonnage) sailed
under the flags of foreign States. In 2010, China’s shipbuilding sector ranked first in the
world in three categories, namely, its accomplished shipbuilding output, volume of new ship
orders, and holding orders, which covered 43%, 54%, and 41% of the world market,
respectively.25
B. Japan
Japan is a traditional maritime power in the world as well as important flag State. As of
January 1, 2013, Japan ranked 14th in the world among the flags of registration with the
largest registered deadweight tonnage.26 Meanwhile, Japan owned the second largest fleet in
the world with 223,815,008 deadweight tonnage, which accounted for 13.87% of the world
fleet.27 Of these Japanese owned fleets, 92.31% of them (in terms of deadweight tonnage) flew
the flags of foreign States.28 Japan is one of the most advanced UNFCCC Annex I States and
has pioneered most energy-efficient shipping technologies. Consequently, although Japan’s
share of world shipbuilding output has fallen from around 34% in 1999 to 18% in 2011, due to
worsening global economic conditions,29 Japan is still receiving many international orders for
building larger and more complicated vessels with more added values. Japan’s shipping
industry is competitive in the international high-level or energy efficient shipbuilding
market.30

(2003), 2, available at http://www.docin.com/p-428858926.html (last visited on Oct. 10, 2014).
23

UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 56.

24

Id. at 41.

25

Yuzhen Xie et al. 解玉真等, The Impacts of the EEDI on the Chinese Shipbuilding and Shipping Industries

EEDI 对中国造船及航运业的影响 (available only in Chinese) 11 CHINA MARITIME 中国海事 24 (2011).
26

UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 56.

27

Id. at 43.

28

Id.

29

During this period, China and South Korea both increased their shares of world shipbuilding output and
reached 39% and 31% respectively. Council Working Party on Shipbuilding, supra note 20, at 23.

30

Id. at 30.
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C. South Korea
The South Korean shipbuilding sector only began its development in the early 1970s.
Nevertheless, to date, South Korea has become one of the main shipping nations of the world.
As of January 1, 2013, South Korea controlled the fifth largest owned fleets (dwt) in the
world with 764 vessels registered under Korean flags and 812 registered in other flag States.31
The deadweight tonnage it owned in that year accounted for 4.65% of the world total.32 The
South Korean shipbuilding sector has ranked first among South Korean exports since 2008,33
and is now home to seven of the world’s ten largest shipbuilding companies. Among the
seven top shipbuilders, Hyundai Heavy Industries (“HHI”), Samsung Heavy Industries
(“SHI”) and Daewoo Shipbuilding (“DSB”), also called the ‘Big 3’, are believed to have
dominated the global market in terms of output.34
D. Assessment
Given that China, Japan and South Korea are all important players of international shipping
trade, these three countries are also competitors in global shipping market, in particular in
shipbuilding market. With its booming shipbuilding capability, South Korea overtook Japan
to be the world’s largest shipbuilding nation in 2000, after Japan surpassed its European
counterparts in 1956. This title was taken over by China in 2010 due to China’s better
performance in exports of ships, but in 2011 South Korea regained the top spot as global
shipowners ordered more complex high-technological vessels, in the production of which
currently South Korea has absolute advantages over China.35 Against this backdrop, China,
Japan and South Korea have made differentiated responses to the IMO’s regulatory
initiatives.
III. China, Japan and South Korea’s Perspectives on Regulatory
Principles of GHG Emissions from International Shipping
It is generally accepted that the varying interpretations of Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol
31

UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 43.

32

Id.

33

M. Porter et al, Shipbuilding Cluster in the Republic of Korea (2010), 18, available at
http://www.docin.com/p-373755421.html (last visited on Oct. 10, 2014).

34

Id.

35

A. Lee, South Korean Shipbuilding Faces Hard Times, Hyundai Heavy Reflects (Feb. 2, 2012), available at
http://gcaptain.com/south-korean-shipbuilding-faces/ (last visited on Sept. 28, 2014).
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by various countries has been the core obstacle in the regulation of shipping GHG emissions
by the IMO. In other words, it is still open to debate whether the IMO has a mandate from
the Kyoto Protocol to regulate the GHG issue.36 This discussion is significant in the sense
that the generally-accepted origin of the IMO’s GHG mandate determines what kind of
regulatory principles and measures apply to the regulation of this GHG issue.37 Generally
speaking, if an international treaty gives the IMO a mandate, the principles incorporated into
the treaty should also apply to the IMO’s regulation of the GHG issue.38 Therefore, if the
IMO gets its mandate to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping from the
Kyoto Protocol, the Common but Differentiated Responsibility (“CBDR”) principle39 which
runs through the Kyoto Protocol40 should apply to GHG emissions reductions from ships.
Similarly, if the Convention on the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter IMO
Convention) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)41 give
the IMO this GHG mandate, the No More Favourable Treatment (“NMFT”) principle,42
which has been consistently incorporated by all IMO agreements, should apply to this issue.
Meanwhile, once the origin of the IMO’s GHG mandate is agreed, the measures beyond the
IMO’s competence should not be adopted by the IMO to regulate this GHG issue.
36

There are two views contributing to this debate. One view is that the IMO’s mandate to regulate GHG
emissions from ships is solely from the Kyoto Protocol. See, e.g., A. Miola, M. Marra and B. Ciuffo, Designing
A Climate Change Policy for the International Maritime Transport Sector: Market-Based Measures and
Technological Options for Global and Regional Policy Actions, 39(9) Energy Pol’y 5492 (2011); Jodie Moffat,
Arranging Deckchairs on the Titanic: Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and International Shipping,
24(2) A&NZ Mar L.J. 104-125, 105 (2010). The other view attributes the IMO’s mandate in regulating GHG
emissions from ships to the IMO Convention, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Law, and IMO
Resolution 8. See, e.g., Md. Saiful Karim and Shawkat Alam, Climate Change and Reduction of Emissions of
Greenhouse Gases from Ships: An Appraisal, 1(1) Asian J. Int’l L. 131-148, 147-148 (2011); Oberthür, supra
note 7, at 195.
37

Yubing Shi, Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping: The Response from China’s Shipping
Industry to the Regulatory Initiatives of the International Maritime Organization, 29 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L.
77-115, 82 (2014).
38

Id. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 31, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679; Convention on the InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, art 41, Mar. 6, 1948, 289 U.N.T.S. 3, amended and renamed
as Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Nov. 14, 1975, 9 U.T.S. 61 (‘IMO Convention’).

39

The CBDR principle requires both developed and developing States to contribute to addressing environmental
problems, but imposes the primary responsibility on developed States due to their different historical
contribution to the problems and the differentiated capability of developed and developing States. This principle
was first explicitly formulated in Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and
has been widely accepted and endorsed in many conventions and treaties, including the UNFCCC and its Kyoto
Protocol. See Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 287 (Cambridge University Press,
2nd ed, 2003).
40

Kyoto Protocol art 10.

41

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (‘UNCLOS’).

42

The NMFT principle refers to ‘port States enforcing applicable standards in a uniform manner to all ships in
their ports, regardless of flag’. Buhaug et al, supra note 2, at 20. See also MARPOL 73/78 art 5(4).
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Alternatively, the IMO may collaborate with other competent international organisations in
adopting these measures.43 China, Japan and South Korea have expressed their positions and
provided theoretical analysis to underpin their arguments due to the significance of the
IMO’s mandate issue.
A. China’s Perspective
China has expressed its views on this GHG issue by submitting a number of proposals and
statements to the IMO since the 52nd Marine Environment Protection Committee (“MEPC”)
meeting in 2004.44 Through submitting these documents, China has attempted to address
three concerns such as: (1) what is the scope of the IMO’s mandate and competence in
regulating the GHG issue?; (2) why the CBDR principle should be applied to the GHG issue?;
and (3) how the CBDR principle could be applied to this issue?45
China took the view that the scope of the IMO’s competence in regulating the GHG
issue should be limited to technology or methodology related matters,46 and the proposed
MBMs under discussion are beyond the competence of the IMO.47 Supporting the IMO to
regulating technical issues, however, China thus asserted that MBMs should be decided by
the UNFCCC if they are to be regulated in the future. 48 Although this view has been
supported by a number of developing countries,49 China did not provide legal basis for its
assertion in its submitted documents. Indeed, the IMO Convention provides the

43

Shi, supra note 37.

44

The MEPC is responsible for the regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping. IMO Convention
arts 11, 38; IMO Resolution A.963(23) art 1.
45

See, e.g., Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 59th Session, 2, Statement by the
Delegation of China on GHG Issues, IMO Doc MEPC 59/24/Add.1 Annex 13 (2009); Application of the
Principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
International Shipping, para 5, submitted by China and India, MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc
MEPC 58/4/32 (Aug. 15, 2008); Comments on the Proposed Mandatory Energy Efficiency Regulations, para 14,
submitted by China, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC
62/5/10 (May 5, 2011).
46

Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Sixth Session, para 4.58, MEPC 56th
Session, Agenda Item 23, IMO Doc MEPC 56/23 (Jul. 30, 2007); Report of the Marine Environment Protection
Committee on its 59th Session, 2, Statement by the Delegation of China on GHG Issues, IMO Doc MEPC
59/24/Add.1 Annex 13 (2009).
47

Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, annex 4, p 2, MEPC 60th
Session, Agenda Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 60/22 (Apr. 12, 2010).
48

Id.

49

For example, this view was also held by Brazil, Venezuela and Malaysia. See Report of the Marine
Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, annex 3, pp 5-7, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda
Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 61/24 (Oct. 6, 2010).
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Organization with economic purpose.50 However, in practice the purposes of the IMO have
been limited to technical aspects only,51 and its economic mandate has never been allowed to
be exercised.52 Meanwhile, China and its shipping industry are opposed to any unilateral
actions, in particular, the proposed inclusion of GHG emissions from international shipping
into a European Union Emission Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”).53
China has put forward five reasons to underpin the application of the CBDR principle to
GHG emissions from international shipping. First, the IMO received its mandate to regulate
the GHG issue from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol; this is also the only mandate in
regulating the GHG issue.54 Therefore, the fundamental principles that UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol have set for regulating climate change, including the CBDR principle, should
also apply to the IMO in addressing GHG emissions from international shipping.55
Second, the CBDR principle is not just the principle drawn from UNFCCC and its Kyoto
Protocol; it rather represents the fundamental consensus of the international community in
tackling climate change. 56 Thus, all relevant international organizations should give due
respect to the CBDR principle when they contribute to addressing climate change. The IMO
is no exception.57
Third, the IMO Assembly rejected a recommendation that Resolution A.963 (23) on the
reduction of GHG emissions from ships “should be based on a common policy applicable to
all ships rather than based on the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol” in 2003.58 China is
opined that the above assertion by MEPC was proved ‘wrong.’ The IMO’s Legal Division
interpreted that its GHG mandate was not from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol, but from
the UNCLOS and the IMO Convention.59 However, China argued that Article 2(2) shall only
50

IMO Convention art 1(b)(c).

51

G. P. Pamborides, International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement 83 (1999).

52

Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Vessel-source Marine Pollution: the Law and Politics of International Regulation 75
(2006).
53

Shi, supra note 37, at 112.

54

Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 59th Session, 1, Statement by the Delegation of
China on GHG Issues, IMO Doc MEPC 59/24/Add.1 Annex 13 (2009).
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be interpreted by the Conference of the Parties (“COP”) and the COP serving as the Meeting
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (“CMP”), which are the competent bodies of the
Protocol rather than any other body. 60 China agreed that Articles 1 and 64 of the IMO
Convention give the IMO competence in regulating the GHG issue, but underscored that the
Kyoto Protocol is still “the most direct and authoritative” for such authorization.61 From the
perspective of international law, China’s rebuttal on the interpretation of Article 2(2) of the
Kyoto Protocol by the Legal Division of the IMO is persuasive in the sense that the IMO is
not the competent organization for such interpretation.62 However, China’s argument on the
relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and the IMO Convention in authorizing the IMO
this regulatory work is lack of sufficient legal basis. This is because the Kyoto Protocol and
the IMO Convention are two parallel treaties; it is thus unlikely to tell which treaty should
prevail when there is a conflict between them.63 For this reason, it is not persuasive for China
to claim that the Kyoto Protocol is the “most direct and authoritative” for the IMO’s work in
regulating this GHG issue.64
Fourth, to apply the NMFT principle and exclude the application of the CBDR principle
to the GHG issue would be unfair for developing countries. The largest share of GHG
emissions from international shipping is attributed to the historical development of the
shipping industry in developed countries,65 currently controlling the majority of the world
deadweight tonnage.66 That is why the application of the NMFT principle would place the
technologically disadvantaged developing countries in a worse position for development due
to their lack of “survival emissions”.67
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Fifth, as a response to a criticism that the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG
issue would possibly make most ships exempt from the global reduction regulations due to
the existence of Flag of Convenience (“FOC”),68 China asserted that this concern could be
addressed. In China’s view, the beneficially-owned tonnage could be targeted in a way that
was utilized by the Review of Maritime Transport by the UNCTAD, based on the data
supplied by Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay.69 China suggested that the nationality of ships (flag
State) be defined as the nationality of shipowners for the purpose of applying the CBDR
principle in the context of GHG emissions from international shipping.70 In this way, the
application of the CBDR principle would not seemingly make the ships, which are owned by
the nationals of developed States but are flying the flags of developing States, be exempt from
compulsory reduction commitments. However, shipowners may be companies or other
business entities in law. It is thus possible that the nationals of developed States register
their companies in developing States investing in ships so as to avoid the stringent
regulations. China maintained that the CBDR principle should be applied to all three routes
of reduction measures such as technical, operational measures and MBMs.71 In a broad sense
the ‘differentiated responsibility’ element of the CBDR principle consists of the following
three categories: (1) differentiated central obligations; (2) differentiated implementation
arrangements; and (3) the granting of assistance including financial and technological
assistance. 72 China suggested all these three scenarios to the energy efficiency measures
being discussed within the IMO, although two of these proposals have not got positive
responses by other IMO member States. At the 61st MEPC meeting, China proposed that
EEDI “should be mandatory to developed countries and voluntary to developing countries.”73
This proposal reflects China’s interpretation on applying the CBDR principle to this GHG
issue. That is to impose differentiated central obligations on various States. At the 62nd
MEPC meeting, China proposed a phased-in approach for developing countries in
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implementing EEDI and SEEMP.

74

This approach belongs to the “differentiated

implementation arrangement” element of the CBDR principle. However, neither of them was
accepted by most countries. Under these circumstances, after the adoption of the revised
MARPOL Annex VI, China turned to the last opportunity of partially incorporating the
CBDR principle to the energy efficiency measures.75 The recognition of the CBDR principle
was eventually written into the MEPC resolution on technical cooperation and transfer of
technology. As a result, China was getting more enthusiastic to participating in related
discussions under the guidance of the CBDR principle.76 Considering that many developed
countries reserved their positions on this provision, however, whether the CBDR principle
can be reflected in the implementation of this resolution is still doubted.
China has been a persistent opponent of MBMs to be applied to this GHG issue. However,
China has suggested that, if a MBM is to be adopted, the CBDR principle should apply in a
manner that “no extra financial responsibility” will be brought to developing countries.77 She
proposed two principles to achieve this goal. First, the basic principles and key elements of
MBMs should be determined by UNFCCC.78 Second, any funds generated from any MBM
should be only provided to the shipping sector in developing countries. 79 If comparing
China’s claims with the current MBM proposals, it would not be straightforward to meet
China’s proposal.
B. Japan’s Perspective
In comparison with these large developing countries like China and India which frequently
reiterated their positions on the CBDR principle by lodging their statements to the IMO,
Japan formally expressed its views on the regulatory principles for addressing GHG
emissions from international shipping at the 58th and 59th MEPC meetings. First, Japan
supported the role of the IMO in regulating the GHG issue asserting that there should be
74
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adherence to the NMFT principle.80 It supported the nine fundamental principles agreed at
the 57th MEPC meeting.81 In view of strong opposition from many countries on the second
principle (hereinafter NMFT principle), however, Japan, together with some other States,
suggested an improved expression of this principle in order to reach consensus. It proposed
that the future IMO framework should be “binding and equally applicable to all ships” rather
than “binding and equally applicable to all flag States.”82 However, this proposal was not
accepted by those delegations not supporting the second principle. 83 It was probably
because this proposal still applied the NMFT principle, and thus was opposed by major
developing countries, particularly major shipbuilding developing countries. Although these
developing countries can flag their ships with FOC States, various regional Memoranda of
Understanding (“MOUs”) on port State control will make it very difficult to operate and
trade with substandard ships.84
Second, Japan supported the US view that “the IMO’s mandate on GHG emissions from
shipping predates, and does not derive from the Kyoto Protocol.”85 Indeed, if this assertion is
generally agreed, the CBDR principle will “[have] no place in the IMO.”86 However, this view
has been supported by many developed countries, such as Norway, New Zealand, and
Denmark.87
Third, Japan respects the CBDR principle applied in UNFCCC; she argued that the
CBDR principle could be reflected in other ways including through technical cooperation in
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the regulation of the GHG issue.88 Compared to many other developed countries’ positions,89
Japan’s view reveals its willingness of cooperation and compromise. As already discussed,
based on a broad interpretation of the CBDR principle, an effective technical cooperation
including the transfer of technology, in addition to financial assistance from developed
countries to developing countries, could constitute a type of “differentiated responsibility” of
the CBDR principle. In May 2013, however, the IMO adopted a resolution on Promotion of
Technical Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy
Efficiency of Ships, which in the preamble recognised both the CBDR and NMFT
principles.90 Although the expressions utilize the words “being cognizant” to replace the
proposed “acknowledging” by other countries, it was encouraging for most developing
countries to expect more beneficial measures in facilitating the transfer of technologies as
regulated in the amended Annex VI to the MARPOL.91 As a response to this adoption, Japan,
together with Australia and the US, lodged a statement to the meeting report, which
clarified that the CBDR principle applies in UNFCCC while the NMFT principle applies in
the IMO and under the MARPOL 73/78. 92 This statement indicates that Japan did not
welcome the application of the CBDR principle to this issue from any perspective, although
it asserted earlier at the 58th MEPC meeting that this principle could be reflected in certain
ways.
C. South Korea’s Perspective
South Korea is a highly-developed shipbuilding country and has actively participated in the
discussions on proposed technical, operational measures and MBMs within the IMO. At the
61st MEPC meeting in 2011, South Korea asserted that the IMO is “the appropriate body to
develop and enact regulations for emissions from international shipping.”93
Unlike its Chinese counterparts, the South Korean shipbuilding sector, in particular its
88
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large-sized shipbuilding companies, welcomes the planned unilateral actions by the EU to
strengthening environmental regulations. 94 South Korea’s large shipbuilders believe that
they can gain more orders for constructing high-efficiency, eco-friendly ships once various
EU technical, operational and market-based measures are in place. 95 In contrast to the
positive attitudes to reducing GHG emissions from ships by Korean shipping associations
and large-sized shipbuilding companies, small and medium-sized shipping companies,
however, are not so supportive of this kind of regulation. A survey in 2011 revealed that
Korea’s small and medium-sized shipping firms were concerned that stricter environmental
regulations on ships might further increase their manufacturing costs and weaken their price
competitiveness, while their Chinese counterparts might not be influenced in this way.96
Due to the existence of such a gap between different shipping firms, many small and
medium-sized companies have not started their preparation for incorporating EEDI and
SEEMP measures, 97 while large size companies have responded quickly to meet new
requirements. E.g., HHI has been keen to develop its environmentally friendly high-value
vessels, including drillships, liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) carriers, mega containerships, and
those using LNG as a fuel.98 With this strategy, HHI has achieved remarkable success in
getting new orders.
With regard to the CBDR principle, South Korea acknowledged it as a significant
political matter which needs “deep consideration”; she pointed out that the matter would be
addressed by ‘various options’99 Additionally, South Korea limited these ‘various options’ to
“financial arrangement for technical cooperation and capacity building for less developed
countries.”100 These expressions indicate that South Korea supported the application of the
CBDR principle to GHG emissions issue based on its broad interpretation on the CBDR
principle; it means that this principle could be applied to this GHG issue by the granting of
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financial assistance and technical cooperation to developing countries. At the 61st MEPC
meeting, South Korea asserted that the IMO is the appropriate body to regulate GHG
emissions from international shipping “with harmonization” between the CBDR principle
and the NMFT principle.101 It can be inferred that South Korea supported the application of
both the CBDR and NMFT principles to the GHG issue, although her interpretation on the
CBDR principle is different from that of China. South Korea has not explicitly expressed its
views on the origin of the IMO’s mandate. However, it supported the nine fundamental
principles adopted by the 57th MEPC meeting.102 The incorporation of the NMFT principle
into the second principle reveals South Korea’s support for applying the NMFT principle to
GHG emissions from ships. This position makes South Korea distinct from many other
UNFCCC non-Annex I States, such as Brazil, South Africa and India.
D. A Comparative Assessment
China, Japan and South Korea all support the leading role of the IMO in regulating technical
and operational measures to reduce shipping GHG emissions. They all agree the role of the
CBDR principle in the global climate change regime, i.e., a regime under UNFCCC and its
Kyoto Protocol. However, their views towards the IMO’s role in regulating MBMs and the
application of the CBDR principle to GHG emissions issue are divergent.
While China doubted the IMO’s competence in regulating MBMs and asserted that this
work should be determined by UNFCCC, both Japan and South Korea supported the IMO’s
role in regulating MBMs. The NMFT principle is the real ground behind the different
positions of these countries. Since it is open to debate whether the Kyoto Protocol is the sole
mandate that the IMO has received so far in regulating GHG emissions issue, it becomes
reasonable for countries to interpret Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol to meet their
regulatory interests. If Chinese argument on the IMO’s competence is accepted by most IMO
member States, the NMFT principle will not be applied to the proposed MBMs in further
regulating this GHG issue. Considering their comparative advantages in energy efficient
technologies, nevertheless, the shipping industries in Japan and South Korea would be less
negatively affected by the increased transportation cost due to possible adoption of MBMs
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than that in China.103 Table 1 provides the divergent views of China, Japan, South Korea and
their shipping industries on the regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping.
Table 1. Positions of China, Japan, South Korea and their shipping industries on the regulation of
GHG emissions from international shipping

Positions

China
Chinese shipping
industry
Japan
Japanese shipping
industry
South Korea
S. Korean
shipping industry

IMO
competence in
regulating
technical &
operational
measures
support
support

IMO
competence in
regulating
MBMs

Application of
the CBDR
principle

Application of
the NMFT
principle

Unilateral
actions by
the EU

oppose
oppose

support
support

oppose
oppose

oppose
oppose

support
support

support
support

oppose
oppose

support
support

unknown
unknown

support

support

support

unknown

support

support

“conditional”
recognition
unknown

support

support

Source: Compiled by the author.

The shipping industries in China and South Korea have opposite views on possible unilateral
actions by the EU. The EU generally launches its unilateral actions when the regulatory
process of competent international organizations is slow, and these unilateral actions are
usually more stringent than the proposals being discussed within the international
organization. 104 For this reason, these different views from Chinese and South Korean
shipping industries probably reveal that under proposed IMO regulations the
technologically-advantaged Korean shipping industry would be more competitive when
compared to its Chinese competitors. Although Japan’s shipping industry has pioneered
most energy efficient shipping technologies, it remains unclear whether she supports
possible unilateral actions by the EU.105
103
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China has continuously supported the application of the CBDR principle to GHG
emissions from ships. Although China interpreted this principle as differentiated central
obligations between developed countries and developing countries, China also attempted to
apply other options to partially adopt the principle. They are differentiated implementation
arrangement and the granting of financial assistance and transfer of technology. Compared
with China, Japan opposed the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG issue from any
perspective. Actually, this comparison reflects the conflict between major developing and
developed countries as to approaches of appropriately balancing equity and fairness in
combating climate change; today there is a trend of weakening the CBDR principle in global
climate change negotiations.106
While China supported the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG issue rather
than the NMFT principle, South Korea welcomed the application of both principles in this
regard. In addition to their different views towards the NMFT principle, the divergence of
China and South Korea also lies in their differing interpretation of the CBDR principle. To
some extent, the CBDR principle that South Korea interpreted is not the same one that
China understood. This indicates that there are differing regulatory interests between States
which are not listed under Annex I to UNFCCC. Aside from large developing countries
which are also main importing countries, main FOC States, least developed countries and
small-island developing States all have differentiated regulatory interests.107 Such difference
determines that these UNFCCC non-Annex I States take differentiated positions on this
CBDR issue.
In comparison to Japan’s opposition to the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG
issue, South Korea adopted a “conditional” recognition of this principle. Although both Japan
and South Korea are the members of OECD, their different legal affiliations under the Kyoto
Protocol may lead to the differentiated regulatory interests and responses.
IV. Conclusion
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The international community has a goal of limiting an increase of two degrees Celsius in the
global average temperature by 2100 in tackling climate change.108 However, a recent report
by the Asian Development Bank reveals that an increase of two degrees Celsius by 2050 is
“almost unavoidable”109 Compared with the average of 1961-1990, mean temperatures will be
1.9-2.6 degrees Celsius higher across the East Asian region in 2050 and 3.8-5.2 degrees
Celsius higher in 2090.110 Owing to the significant contributions of China, Japan and South
Korea to global climate change,111 it is vital for these three countries to ensure the compliance
of their ships with the adopted energy efficiency measures. Nevertheless, EEDI has had and
will continue to have more negative impacts on Chinese shipbuilding industry than on the
shipping industries in Japan and South Korea; the Index may even “trigger another migration
of shipbuilding industry in the future.”112 It will thus be more important for China to secure
the incorporation of the CBDR principle in certain ways as to future improvement of the
EEDI and SEEMP, as well as future adoption of MBMs.
As discussed throughout this paper, the differentiated perspectives of these three
countries on the regulation of GHG emissions issue generally reflect their differing
regulatory interests. Therefore, it is significant to take their differentiated interests into
account in the developing regulatory regime to avoid disproportionate burdens being placed
on certain countries, in particular developing countries.
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